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7. COMING FROM GOOD STOCK: 
CAREER HISTORIES AND NEW 
VENTURE FORMATION 
M. Diane Burton, Jesper B. Sorensen and 
Christine M. Beckman 
ABSTRACT 
We examine how the social structure of existing organizations influences 
entrepreneurship and suggest that resources accrue to entrepreneurs based 
on the structural position of their prior employers. We argue that infor-
mation advantages allow individuals from entrepreneurially prominent 
prior firms to identify new opportunities. Entrepreneurial prominence also 
reduces the perceived uncertainty of a new venture. Using a sample of 
Silicon Valley start-ups, we demonstrate that entrepreneurial prominence 
is associated with initial strategy and the probability of attracting external 
financing. New ventures with high prominence are more likely to be 
innovators; furthermore, innovators with high prominence are more likely 
to obtain financing. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has often been noted that some of the most radically innovative products and 
technologies are developed and commercialized not by existing companies, but 
rather by entrepreneurial ventures (Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman & Anderson, 
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1986; Henderson & Clark, 1990). This is a remarkable fact, given that creating 
a new organization requires the mobilization of a substantial array of social and 
material resources (Stinchcombe, 1965). These resource mobilization tasks are 
simplified when entrepreneurs choose to focus on proven, established products 
and technologies. By contrast, organizations devoted to new products and tech-
nologies face severe hurdles. The entrepreneur must not only come up with a 
new idea, but also overcome the skepticism of resource providers, since the 
uncertainty and risk associated with any new venture is particularly heightened 
when the underlying product or technology is unproven (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
Where do innovative new ventures come from? The simple answer is that 
they emerge - directly and indirectly - from established firms (Freeman, 1986). 
Contrary to popular myths of lone college drop-out entrepreneurs, most new 
ventures are founded by people with prior employment experience (Cooper, 
1985; Robinson & Sexton, 1994). In this sense, entrepreneurs are organizational 
products: "Organizations create their own competition by providing the skills 
and background that provide credibility for the entrepreneur. They provide the 
knowledge of opportunity by placing that person in a position to know about 
unserved or badly served markets" (Freeman, 1986, p. 39). 
In this paper we argue that entrepreneurial opportunities and resources accrue 
to incipient entrepreneurs as a function of the structural position of their prior 
employers. Much as geographical regions differ in their rates of entrepreneurial 
activity, established firms differ markedly along this dimension. Some firms are 
entrepreneurial hotbeds, as perhaps most famously exemplified by Fairchild 
Semiconductor, founded in 1957. Fairchild spawned ten new ventures in its first 
eight years; moreover, most of the thirty-one semiconductor firms founded in 
Silicon Valley in the 1960s could trace their lineage to Fairchild (Saxenian, 
1994; Rogers & Larsen, 1984). Examples of such "Fairchildren" include Intel, 
Advanced Micro Devices and LSI Logic. Other firms give rise to relatively 
few, if any, new ventures.1 
In this paper, we argue that one consequence of these differences in rates of 
entrepreneurial activity among established firms is to influence the visibility of 
established firms in the entrepreneurial community. We use the term entrepre-
neurial prominence to describe these differences in visibility. We consider 
established firms that spawn a large number of new ventures through employee 
departures to be more entrepreneurially prominent than those that do not. Our 
core contention is that innovative new ventures are more likely to emerge from 
established firms that are entrepreneurially prominent. We expect this for two 
reasons. First, we believe that there are important informational and resource 
benefits to being affiliated with a prominent firm. Second, we argue that there 
are substantial reputational benefits that accrue to employees of prominent firms, 
and that these benefits play a crucij 
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and that these benefits play a crucial role in reducing the perceived uncertainty 
surrounding a venture. We conceive of the entrepreneurial prominence of 
established firms as a form of social capital that is transferred to employees as 
they leave the firm and attempt to launch new ventures. We explore how 
differences in the entrepreneurial prominence of established firms affects the 
characteristics of entrepreneurial behavior. Thus, while established firms may 
have difficulty innovating (S0rensen & Stuart, 2000) and commercializing new 
innovations (Hiltzik, 1999), they play an important passive role in shaping the 
emergence of entrepreneurial ventures. 
Our paper is related to and draws on a number of streams of theory and 
research. First, there is a long sociological interest in the emergence of new 
organizations. In fact, one of the early propositions put forward by Stinchcombe 
is that "the probability that a man or group of men will be motivated to start 
an organization is dependent on the social structure and the position of men 
within it." (1965, p. 147). Furthermore, sociologists have argued for some time 
that the dynamics of new venture formation depend critically on the distribu-
tion of opportunities and resources through social structure (Light, 1972; Hannan 
& Freeman, 1977; Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). However, most efforts to examine 
organizational emergence come from the ecological tradition where there is 
keen attention to the broad structural characteristics of firms, but little attempt 
to link individuals to this social structure. At the same time, attempts to link 
fixed individual attributes, such as psychological characteristics, to entrepre-
neurial activity have met with limited success (Brockhaus & Horwitz, 1986; 
Herron & Robinson, 1993). Our paper explicitly reconnects individuals and 
organizations with a distinctly sociological approach that allows us to explore 
whether some individuals, by virtue of their location in the social structure of 
existing organizations, are better able to form highly uncertain, innovative 
start-ups. 
Second, there is a growing interest in the economic and sociological litera-
ture on technological innovation in the operation of geographical "spillover" 
effects (Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993; Saxenian, 1994; Stuart & 
Sorenson, in press). These studies examine how horizontal differentiation along 
a geographic dimension affects the innovative activity of established firms and 
the emergence of new ventures. For example, Jaffe et al. (1993) find that the 
patenting rates of established firms are positively influenced by the patenting 
activity of other firms in the same metropolitan area. Saxenian (1994) argues 
that the distinctive organizational arrangements and cultures in Silicon Valley 
are a source of the regions' high levels of entrepreneurial activity. Stuart and 
Sorenson (in press), studying the biotechnology industry, argue that new firms 
are more likely to emerge in regions that have a high density of established 
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biotechnology activity. Similarly, there is a long-standing interest in under-
standing how horizontal differentiation among industries leads to differential 
rates of entrepreneurship and innovation (e.g. Cohen & Levin, 1989). Our 
approach differs from these literatures in that we do not seek to understand 
regional or industrial differences in entrepreneurial activity; in fact, we focus 
on a single region, Silicon Valley and a limited number of high-technology 
industries. Instead, we investigate the consequences of vertical differentiation 
among firms in terms of status, prominence, or visibility (Benjamin & Podolny, 
1999; Podolny, 1993; Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). 
Third, students of organizations have become increasingly interested in how 
the movement of individuals between organizations shapes organizational 
behavior and industry dynamics. Most studies of this phenomenon start from 
the notion that managerial outlooks and predispositions are shaped by career 
histories (Gunz & Jalland, 1996), and that the movement of managers across 
firm boundaries is an occasion for the diffusion of ideas and innovations (Baty, 
Evan & Rothermel, 1971; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973; Boeker, 1997; S0rensen, 
1999). Because managers in different firms have divergent experiences, the 
pattern of movement between firms is an important determinant of industry 
dynamics. Past studies of this process have focused on the movement of 
managers between existing organizations. By contrast, we focus on those 
managers who leave their jobs to start new firms and thus shed light on the 
effects of career trajectories on industry dynamics. 
Fourth, since we attach primary significance to the career histories of entre-
preneurs, our research is also related to work that examines how career histories 
shape the entrepreneurial process (Brittain & Freeman, 1986; Boeker, 1988; 
Higgins & Gulati, 1999; Shane & Khurana, 1999). Work histories are important 
determinants of the resources available to entrepreneurs. Prior research on 
the effects of entrepreneur's pre-ownership experiences tends to focus on the 
types of work that entrepreneurs have performed in the course of their careers 
(Shane, 2000; Jones-Evans, 1996; Cooper & Dunkelberg, 1986). By contrast, 
we emphasize where entrepreneurs worked prior to founding the new venture; 
in other words, we focus on the identity of previous employers. By doing so, 
we capitalize on the notion that careers situate the entrepreneur in a social 
structure of existing firms that facilitates or constrains the flow of opportunities 
and resources. We ask how the social structure of existing firms influences the 
entrepreneurial process. 
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, in contrast to the studies 
of the relationship between managerial mobility and organizational behavior 
cited above, we draw attention to the informational and reputational benefits 
that may come from being associated with prominent employers. Second, by 
Coming From Good Stock 
focusing on where founders worked 
organizations influences the entrepi 
new ventures according to their init 
nation of the entrepreneurial proce 
In order to cast light on where ti 
unique sample of Silicon Valley star 
initial strategies and financing. W< 
these ventures: (1) their founding 
pursue an innovation strategy; and 
external financing at founding. We i 
ing the identities of past employers, 
of the established firms affects the J 
The remainder of this paper is 
we outline a series of arguments 
established firms to the character 
characteristics of our data and th 
presentation of results is followed 
ENTREPRENEUR 
FIRM 
Students of the link between « 
examined how the accumulatior 
influences the formation of n 
emphasized how job experiences 
(potential) entrepreneurs. For ex* 
occupational backgrounds of tecl 
bring to their ventures. He fi 
academic research settings hav 
managerial competence. In a sin 
past experiences of founders aff< 
new venture performance impi 
between the task environment c 
faced by the entrepreneur in his 
tends to improve to the extent 
are similar to those previously c 
& Jansen, 1992; Cooper, Gim 
(1999) demonstrates how diffe 
entrepreneurs shapes their com 
the same technological innovati 
0RENSEN AND C. M. BECKMAN Coming From Good Stock 233 
long-standing interest in imder-
lg industries leads to differential 
.g. Cohen & Levin, 1989). Our 
at we do not seek to understand 
leurial activity; in fact, we focus 
nited number of high-technology 
juences of vertical differentiation 
•r visibility (Benjamin & Podolny, 
Is, 1999). 
me increasingly interested in how 
anizations shapes organizational 
JS of this phenomenon start from 
dispositions are shaped by career 
le movement of managers across 
)n of ideas and innovations (Baty, 
;i, 1973; Boeker, 1997; S0rensen, 
have divergent experiences, the 
mportant determinant of industry 
e focused on the movement of 
3y contrast, we focus on those 
firms and thus shed fight on the 
imics. 
;e to the career histories of entre-
that examines how career histories 
fe Freeman, 1986; Boeker, 1988; 
?99). Work histories are important 
entrepreneurs. Prior research on 
ixperiences tends to focus on the 
med in the course of their careers 
Dunkelberg, 1986). By contrast, 
rior to founding the new venture; 
previous employers. By doing so, 
uate the entrepreneur in a social 
onstrains the flow of opportunities 
re of existing firms influences the 
is. First, in contrast to the studies 
>ility and organizational behavior 
national and reputational benefits 
prominent employers. Second, by 
focusing on where founders worked, we ask how the social structure of existing 
organizations influences the entrepreneurial process. Finally, by differentiating 
new ventures according to their initial strategy, we offer a more nuanced expla-
nation of the entrepreneurial process. 
In order to cast light on where innovative new ventures come from, we use a 
unique sample of Silicon Valley start-ups and investigate the determinants of their 
initial strategies and financing. We focus on explaining two characteristics of 
these ventures: (1) their founding strategies, specifically whether or not they 
pursue an innovation strategy; and (2) the ability of the new ventures to attract 
external financing at founding. We use the career histories of the founders, includ-
ing the identities of past employers, to examine how differences in the prominence 
of the established firms affects the strategy and financing of new ventures. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, 
we outline a series of arguments linking the entrepreneurial prominence of 
established firms to the characteristics of new ventures. We then discuss the 
characteristics of our data and the methods used to test our hypotheses. The 
presentation of results is followed by a discussion section. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL PROMINENCE AND 
FIRM ADVANTAGE 
Students of the link between career histories and entrepreneurship have 
examined how the accumulation of human capital through career histories 
influences the formation of new ventures. In particular, scholars have 
emphasized how job experiences shape the technical and managerial skills of 
(potential) entrepreneurs. For example, Jones-Evans (1996) examines how the 
occupational backgrounds of technological entrepreneurs affect the skills they 
bring to their ventures. He finds, for example, that entrepreneurs from 
academic research settings have strong technical skills but low levels of 
managerial competence. In a similar vein, Chandler (1996) examines how the 
past experiences of founders affect the success of new ventures. He finds that 
new venture performance improves to the extent that there is similarity 
between the task environment of the new venture and the task environment 
faced by the entrepreneur in his or her previous job. Similarly, performance 
tends to improve to the extent that the skills required in the new venture 
are similar to those previously developed (Chandler, 1996; see also Chandler 
& Jansen, 1992; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon & Woo, 1994). Finally, Shane 
(1999) demonstrates how differences in the past experiences of a set of 
entrepreneurs shapes their conceptions of the opportunities associated with 
the same technological innovation. 
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As this brief review suggests, the main focus in past research on careers and 
entrepreneurship has been on how careers shape the human capital available to 
entrepreneurs. However, the effects of careers on social capital are neglected 
in existing research (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). Entrepreneurial activity depends 
on access to ideas and resources, and such access is differentially available to 
individuals occupying different positions in the social structure (Burt, 1992). 
One of the key determinants of an individual's position in social structure is 
her career history, in particular her affiliation with different employers. 
Employers shape the personal networks of their employees, expose them to new 
ideas, endow them with valuable resources and confer implicit credentials upon 
them. At the same time, established firms are differentiated from each other 
both horizontally - by virtue of being engaged in different activities - and verti-
cally - by virtue of being more or less visible in different arenas. The nature 
of the resources available to employees therefore typically will differ according 
to the structural position of the employer. Therefore, to understand how the 
social structure of established firms affects entrepreneurial behavior, we must 
consider the consequences of such differentiation among established firms. 
We conceive of the social structure of existing firms as a set of positions 
hierarchically ordered according to the prominence of their occupants. Network 
theorists suggest that an actor's prominence in a social network is a function 
of centrality - the extent to which the actor is extensively involved in relations 
with other actors (Knoke & Burt, 1983). Prominence garners both informational 
and reputational benefits for the actor. In recent years, organizational sociolo-
gists have applied this notion of prominence to understanding organizational 
behavior and industry dynamics (Podolny, 1993; Podolny, Stuart & Hannan, 
1996; Stuart et al., 1999). In this paper we are particularly interested in the 
landscape of existing firms as it relates to the generation of new firms; thus, 
we focus on the entrepreneurial prominence of firms in the existing social 
structure. Established firms acquire entrepreneurial prominence by virtue of then-
being tied to a relatively large number of new ventures. Unlike strategic alliances 
(Stuart et al., 1999) and many other types of interorganizational ties, these ties 
generally are not created intentionally by established firms; rather they are 
formed by virtue of employees leaving to found new ventures. 
Entrepreneurs must be adept at executing two roles: (1) scanning the 
environment for opportunities and devising strategies to take advantage of them; 
and (2) ensuring and managing the flow of resources - such as capital, supplier 
relationships and customers - to the venture such that it may pursue its 
business strategies successfully. Prior employment experience shapes the 
capabilities of entrepreneurs with respect to these two roles. Our argument is 
that entrepreneurs benefit if they launch a venture from a prominent position 
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in this social structure. Employment by a prominent firm benefits the entre-
preneur in two ways: (1) centrality in entrepreneurial networks makes it easier 
to identify entrepreneurial opportunities and to act to exploit the opportunities; 
and (2) the prominence of prior employers helps to reduce the perceived uncer-
tainty of a new venture for external constituents. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities arise when a prospective entrepreneur receives 
new information that, when combined with knowledge already possessed, can 
be translated into something of value (Shane, 2000). As such, the potential that 
an opportunity will be discovered is related to both the stock of knowledge an 
actor possesses and the flow of new information. This implies that human capital 
differences can only partially explain the entrepreneurial process. Structural 
differences in access to new information must also be considered. 
Network theorists have demonstrated that the quantity and quality of the 
information an actor receives is a direct function of the actors social network 
(e.g. Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992). Entrepreneurially prominent firms, by 
virtue of their network centrality, will be exposed to stronger flows of new 
information about technologies, emerging markets, and unmet customer needs. 
High quality information will pass through prominent firms in high volume 
and at a fast rate; thus, employees have a higher propensity to make the neces-
sary information combinations and recognize opportunities. But recognizing 
the opportunity is only the first step in creating a new venture. Prospective 
entrepreneurs must take action to transform an opportunity into a venture. Here, 
we believe that nascent entrepreneurs in entrepreneurially prominent firms 
vicariously benefit from the experiences of those entrepreneurs who preceded 
them. As employees exit to launch new ventures, they likely deposit 
knowledge about the appropriate steps and methods for building an enterprise 
with former colleagues and coworkers. First, coworkers rarely immediately 
sever ties when colleagues change employment. Second, organizations have 
memories residing in long-tenured employees about the actions and activities 
of former employees. Thus, tactical knowledge of entrepreneurship - which 
law firms to call, which financiers to meet, where to locate offices - becomes 
part of the stock and flow of information available to employees of entrepre-
neurially prominent firms. 
Although the information benefits of working for a prominent employer can 
help people to identify entrepreneurial opportunities and allow them to take 
appropriate steps towards becoming an entrepreneur, prospective founders still 
face substantial obstacles to launching the new venture. Entrepreneurs must 
successfully mobilize the resources of wealth, power and legitimacy necessary 
to realize their vision (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). Doing 
so requires overcoming information asymmetries that make it difficult for 
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external resource providers to assess the quality of a new venture or its founders 
ex ante. These problems are exacerbated to the extent that a venture wishes to 
pursue a new, unproven strategy. Under these conditions, external actors are 
likely to arrive at an estimate of the quality of the venture by considering more 
easily observable attributes that are thought to be associated with the quality 
of the venture (Stuart et al., 1999; Podolny, 1993; Spence, 1974). 
One source of information on the quality of the venture lies in the prior 
accomplishments of the founding team members. Here, the career histories of 
entrepreneurs enter through a consideration of the experiences and skills that 
have accumulated through the career. Studies suggest, for example, that 
venture capitalists are particularly interested in the background experiences 
and managerial capabilities of entrepreneurs (MacMillan, Siegel & 
SubbaNarishma, 1985; Goslin & Barge, 1986; but see Hall & Hofer, 1993). 
Indicators of technological competence might include educational credentials 
and patents held. 
A second class of information on the quality of new ventures is reputational, 
and focuses on the identity of the entrepreneurs themselves. Sociologists have 
long maintained that individual reputations are in part constructed from the 
identities of the parties with whom a person associates (Blau, 1964). In partic-
ular, individual reputations benefit from association with prominent actors 
(Goode, 1978). These reputational advantages in turn facilitate the mobilization 
of resources and social action. Sociologists of science, for example, argue that 
scientific careers are enhanced to the extent that young scholars are affiliated 
with prominent individuals in the field (Merton, 1968). Latour (1987) suggests 
that the reception accorded to new ideas depends on the prominence of the 
scientist's associates. Podolny and Stuart (1995) show that other actors are 
drawn to innovations that are advanced by actors whose prior technological 
contributions are perceived as important. 
In a study of entrepreneurial ventures in biotechnology, Stuart et al. (1999) 
demonstrate that the prominence of a venture's alliance partners is positively 
associated with its performance. In their model, new ventures with prominent 
affiliates benefit from an implicit transfer of status from the affiliates. In the 
eyes of third parties, association with high-status partners functions as a 
guarantee as to the quality of the venture. Affiliation with prominent partners 
therefore gives firms an advantage in the competition for customers, suppliers 
and employees. 
We argue that the prominence of prior employers plays a similar role in 
reducing the perceived uncertainty of a new venture. External actors use 
information on previous employers to make inferences about the likelihood 
that the founders will build a successful venture. Third parties suffer from an 
information asymmetry that mak 
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by employers when making emp 
who come from employers that a 
talent benefit from this associatioi 
employers may function as an 
founder (Spence, 1974). This sup] 
are, on average, of higher qu 
prominent firms are also more sue 
resources to attracting and retair 
more in training. Furthermore, h 
prefer employment with promine 
dates for employment at such 
to argue that employers explicit] 
they have a reputational incentiv 
ified employees. Unlike alliance 
risk when associating with a ne\* 
the reputations of prior employ 
ventures of their employees.) 
Finally, employees of entrepi 
because more is likely to be kno> 
nity. Just as centrality in informa 
to information and resources, it i 
and their new ventures. The exp 
founders will be more widely 
employers. In this respect, affiliat 
information asymmetries faced b 
For each of these reasons, the 
more prominent employers posse* 
probability of success in their ne-
start-up proposals from employee 
promising and hence receive mon 
actors will have a greater level o 
have success in the new ventun 
should reduce the perceived unct 
tent with early statements by I 
entrepreneurship, where " . . . the 
which determines whether resou 
patterned." In this paper we prot 
- past employers. 
^ttlSk. 
0RENSEN AND C. M. BECKMAN Coming From Good Stock 237 
ty of a new venture or its founders 
he extent that a venture wishes to 
se conditions, external actors are 
f the venture by considering more 
to be associated with the quality 
1993; Spence, 1974). 
i of the venture lies in the prior 
bers. Here, the career histories of 
of the experiences and skills that 
dies suggest, for example, that 
d in the background experiences 
jneurs (MacMillan, Siegel & 
\6\ but see Hall & Hofer, 1993). 
it include educational credentials 
ty of new ventures is reputational, 
urs themselves. Sociologists have 
are in part constructed from the 
associates (Blau, 1964). In partic-
ssociation with prominent actors 
; in turn facilitate the mobilization 
f science, for example, argue that 
that young scholars are affiliated 
on, 1968). Latour (1987) suggests 
spends on the prominence of the 
L995) show that other actors are 
actors whose prior technological 
•iotechnology, Stuart et al. (1999) 
e's alliance partners is positively 
del, new ventures with prominent 
:
 status from the affiliates. In the 
h-status partners functions as a 
ifiliation with prominent partners 
npetition for customers, suppliers 
mployers plays a similar role in 
2w venture. External actors use 
J inferences about the likelihood 
ture. Third parties suffer from an 
information asymmetry that makes it difficult to assess the true abilities of 
potential entrepreneurs ex ante; this asymmetry is analogous to the one faced 
by employers when making employment decisions. In this setting, founders 
who come from employers that are established incubators for entrepreneurial 
talent benefit from this association. In other words, the prominence of previous 
employers may function as an indicator of the quality of the prospective 
founder (Spence, 1974). This supposition - that employees of prominent firms 
are, on average, of higher quality - may indeed be correct. If more 
prominent firms are also more successful, for example, they can devote greater 
resources to attracting and retaining skilled personnel, and they may invest 
more in training. Furthermore, highly skilled individuals can be expected to 
prefer employment with prominent employers, improving the pool of candi-
dates for employment at such firms. (Note that we are careful here not 
to argue that employers explicitly seek to certify their employees; nor, that 
they have a reputational incentive to ensure that they hire only highly qual-
ified employees. Unlike alliance partners, who may put their reputations at 
risk when associating with a new venture (Stuart et al., 1999), we do not see 
the reputations of prior employers as being at risk in the entrepreneurial 
ventures of their employees.) 
Finally, employees of entrepreneurially prominent firms are advantaged 
because more is likely to be known about them in the entrepreneurial commu-
nity. Just as centrality in information networks may help founders gain access 
to information and resources, it also helps diffuse information about founders 
and their new ventures. The experiences and accomplishments of prospective 
founders will be more widely recognized if they come from prominent 
employers. In this respect, affiliation with prominent employers may reduce the 
information asymmetries faced by a new venture directly. 
For each of these reasons, then, third parties may infer that founders from 
more prominent employers possess, on average, greater skills and have a higher 
probability of success in their new ventures. Because of this, we suspect that 
start-up proposals from employees of prominent firms will a priori seem more 
promising and hence receive more attention from external actors. Thus, external 
actors will have a greater level of confidence in the ability of such founders to 
have success in the new venture. Employment by prominent firms, in short, 
should reduce the perceived uncertainty of a new venture. This idea is consis-
tent with early statements by Stinchcombe (1965, pp. 146-147) regarding 
entrepreneurship, where " . . . the patterns of trust and of mobility of resources 
which determines whether resources can be moved to innovators are socially 
patterned." In this paper we propose a specific source of theses social patterns 
- past employers. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Our arguments suggest that potential entrepreneurs secure informational and 
reputational benefits by virtue of having once been employed by a prominent 
firm. Furthermore, these benefits will be amplified in the face of uncertainty. In 
order to test these assertions, we first examine the level of uncertainty involved 
in the kinds of ventures entrepreneurs start. We distinguish between ventures 
that pursue innovation strategies and those that pursue other strategies. Most of 
the organizational strategy typologies employed by empirical scholars allow for 
this distinction (e.g. Miles & Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980; Miller, 1986). One theme 
across all of the typologies is the importance of differentiating firms that are 
exploiting an existing market from those that are creating a new market. 
Following Maidique and Patch (1982), we believe that this is an especially salient 
distinction for technology-based firms. In our definition, firms pursuing an inno-
vation strategy are seeking to win a technology race in a new niche. These firms 
are attempting to gain competitive advantages by being the first to develop and 
exploit new, hitherto unproven technologies. By contrast, incrementalist start-
ups build upon existing products and technologies, and seek to gain competitive 
advantage through technical enhancements, superior marketing and customer 
service, and/or cost advantages. A critical difference between innovative and 
incrementalist start-ups lies in the degree of uncertainty associated with a new 
venture of each type. High levels of uncertainty characterize innovative start-
ups, as the core products and technologies around which they are built are of 
unknown value. The level of uncertainty for incremental ventures is corre-
spondingly lower, since external actors can more readily judge a venture's 
promise by reference to existing firms. The information asymmetries involved 
in assessing a venture's quality are exacerbated for innovative ventures, and 
founders of innovative ventures must therefore overcome a greater degree of 
perceived uncertainty regarding their firm's prospects. 
Identifying opportunities for innovative ventures requires a good understand-
ing of the future path of technological progress and a wealth of information about 
technological alternatives. Entrepreneurs from prominent firms should be at an 
advantage in both respects. The reputational benefits of being affiliated with a 
prominent employer should make entrepreneurs more successful at reducing the 
perceived uncertainty of their ventures. As a result, the informational and repu-
tational benefits of working for a prominent firm should translate into a superior 
ability to identify opportunities for innovation. Thus we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 1: The prominence of prior employers will be positively related 
to whether a firm pursues an innovative strategy. 
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Our second hypothesis concerns the ability of entrepreneurs to secure external 
financing at the time of firm founding. In particular, we are interested in whether 
entrepreneurs from prominent firms are better able to acquire resources from 
third parties. We suspect that the willingness of third parties to invest in a 
highly uncertain venture during its infancy, before it has any track record by 
which to be assessed, depends on the perceived quality of the new venture. 
There are three ways in which a brand new venture can have higher perceived 
quality: (1) its founders have high levels of human capital; (2) it has a product 
which can be independently evaluated; and (3) it has ties to prominent firms 
that serve as endorsements. While in our analyses, we will attend to all three 
mechanisms, we are primarily interested in the third, thus we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 2: The prominence of founding team's prior employers will have 
a positive effect on the probability of a new venture obtaining external 
financing at the time of founding. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data on New Ventures 
The data for this study are from the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies 
(SPEC) (Baron, Hannan & Burton, 1999, 2001). SPEC is a stratified random 
sample of 173 young high-technology firms in Silicon Valley.2 The sample is 
drawn from the population of firms listed in Rich's Everyday Sales Prospecting 
Guide (1994) and The Technology Resource Guide to Greater Silicon Valley 
(1993/1994) and supplemented with firms from the Silicon Valley business press 
that were too young to appear in published directories. SPEC is a longitudinal 
study of organizational evolution with emphasis on formal systems and prac-
tices. In order to minimize recall bias and to guarantee that the entities under 
consideration could potentially have the need for formalized structures and 
systems, age and size criteria were used to define the population. Firms included 
in the study were no older than 10 years and had at least 10 employees at the 
time of sampling. At the time of sampling, the average firm was 7.3 years old 
and had 89 employees. The sample included firms that ranged in age from 2 
to 12 years and in size from 9 to 2042 employees. The SPEC research team 
conducted interviews with founders, CEOs, and senior managers responsible 
for human resources, gathered survey and archival data, and compiled detailed 
organizational histories for each of the firms in the study. 
Bhide (1999) reports that 60% of start-ups fail within the first six years and 
that even those that survive remain small. Based on these statistics, the SPEC 
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sample is likely biased towards successful start-ups. The nature of the sampling 
frame means that the firms under investigation have achieved some minimum 
scale and longevity. However, it is important to note that attempts were made to 
include younger firms, precisely to minimize survivor bias. Furthermore, despite 
this data limitation - which plagues virtually all survey or interview-based 
organizational research - the SPEC sample has some noteworthy advantages for 
our purposes. First and foremost, it includes firms pursuing different strategies, 
with different sources of capital. Second, it is geographically constrained, which 
increases the probability that multiple founders will have held positions in a given 
employer and thus generate variation in our measure of prominence. For these 
reasons, we believe the sample is appropriate for testing our ideas. 
The first dependent variable of interest in this paper is whether or not the 
firm was founded to pursue a technological innovation strategy. Trained MBA 
and doctoral students conducted semi-structured interviews with a founder of 
each of the firms asking him or her to describe the core competence of the firm 
at founding. The open-ended response (supplemented in some cases by early 
press reports, product announcements, business plans and prospectuses) 
comprised the raw data that was used to categorize each of the firms into one 
of four strategic archetypes: Innovators, Enhancers, Marketers and Low-Cost 
Producers (see Hannan, Burton & Baron, 1996). Innovators are firms that seek 
to gain first-mover advantages by winning a technology race. Enhancer firms 
seek to produce a product similar to other companies, but employ a general 
modification or enhancement to gain competitive advantage. Marketers seek 
competitive advantage through superior sales, marketing or customer service. 
Finally, Low Cost Producers are firms that seek cost advantages through cost 
efficient production techniques, relationships with low cost suppliers, or 
economies of scale. The three latter strategies all revolve around extending 
existing products or services. For the analyses presented here, we collapse the 
latter three categories into one category, thereby focusing on the distinction 
between innovators and incrementalists. In light of suggestions that entrepre-
neurs may selectively recall their company's history (Bhide, 1999), the use of 
a retrospective measure of strategy may seem problematic. However, we feel 
confident that our measure captures the difference between innovators and incre-
mentalists with a high degree of accuracy. In particular, respondents were not 
asked to classify their strategies themselves; rather researchers coded strategies 
based on business plans, prospectuses, and articles from the business press 
describing the industry. Furthermore, Hellman and Puri (1999) perform a 
number of post-hoc analyses of the same data, including linking patenting 
activity to strategy and finding that innovators accumulate larger patent 
portfolios, which increase our confidence in the measure. 
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The second dependent variable is whether the firm received external financing 
at the time of founding. New ventures have a variety of alternative sources of 
capital. Some entrepreneurs self-finance the early start-up phase by using their 
own personal assets. Other entrepreneurs have a source of revenue or cash flow, 
such as a licensing agreement or a consulting contract, that finances the venture. 
Still others are able to mobilize the resources of friends and family to support 
the early stages of a new enterprise. Many must seek capital from external third 
parties such as venture capitalists, private investors (so-called "angels"), corpo-
rate investors, commercial or investment banks, other financial institutions such 
as pension funds or insurance companies, or the government. These alternative 
funding sources vary in the extent to which they are willing to associate with 
risky ventures and in the price at which they provide capital. Venture capital-
ists and private investors anchor the end of the continuum that finances the 
most uncertain enterprises at the highest price (see Roberts & Stevenson (1991) 
for an overview of start-up financing). Not surprisingly, most of the start-up 
firms that received external funds at inception obtained the funds from these 
high price sources. Thus, the task of attracting external financing was one of 
persuading investors who were in the business of evaluating risky ventures. 
Information on the financing history of each of the SPEC firms was collected 
via a combination of public and proprietary databases, SEC filings and annual 
reports, internal company documents and a survey instrument that was sent to 
the most senior finance executive at each of the firms.3 In this paper we focus 
on whether or not an entrepreneurial venture received funds from any outside 
investor at inception. We do not distinguish types of investors, nor do we differ-
entiate so-called "seed money" from first or second round financing, nor do we 
account for differences in the amount of financing. Instead our variable is simply 
a measure of whether the founding team had any amount of money from any 
third party at the earliest moments of the firm's existence. Of course it is inter-
esting to note that the vast majority of external investors in the SPEC sample 
were venture capitalists (71%) with some angels (13%) and corporate investors 
(13%). Only one of the SPEC firms borrowed start-up funds from a commer-
cial bank. The invested amount for all stages of investment (for the subset of 
firms for which we have the data) ranged from $10,000 to $30,000,000 with 
one firm receiving $100,000,000 in cash and stock as part of a merger agree-
ment. Excluding this outlier firm, the average investment size is just under $2.5 
million, and the amounts of initial investments are on the small end of the 
distribution. 
We are interested in whether a founding team can persuade third parties that 
their venture is promising before they have begun significant operations and 
have a tangible organizational track record that can be evaluated. Having an 
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external third party provide financial capital is evidence that the team was 
successful. Ideally, we want to capture those firms that have external funds at 
inception. In practice, this is difficult to operationalize. There are ambiguities 
and inaccuracies inherent in both the founding dates and the financing dates. 
Most scholars define the birth of a firm as the date that it was legally incor-
porated. However, in constructing organizational life histories for very young 
firms we discovered that many had substantial lives - ones that involved full-
time employees and/or revenues from sales - well before the founders ever 
approached a lawyer to incorporate them. For this reason we define the founding 
date as the earliest possible date that there is any indication that a new 
organization exists, including legal incorporation, having a full-time employee, 
or selling a product. This sets the start-up clock to begin at the earliest possible 
moment. Similarly, financing dates recorded in commercial databases and on 
our surveys were often recorded in terms of annual "quarters." Even in cases 
where a precise date was given, we understood this to be the date a financing 
deal closed, rather than the moment when negotiations commenced or even 
when a "handshake" or verbal agreement was reached. Thus, in order to 
accommodate these recording inaccuracies, we coded a firm as having external 
financing at founding if it was received within three months of the 
founding date.4 
Data on Founders' Careers 
We have further augmented the SPEC data with information on the career histo-
ries of each of the founding team members of the SPEC companies. As part 
of the data collection process, the SPEC research team interviewed and surveyed 
a founder of each of the firms. This informant was asked to identify, by name, 
the other members of the founding team. This list of founding team members 
was then verified through archival research of public documents as well as 
internal company records available to the research team. Among the 173 SPEC 
firms, founding team size ranged from 1 to 12 (with an average team size of 
3). For each founding team member, SPEC research assistants searched a 
number of archival sources, including SEC filings, company documents, news-
paper articles and profiles, electronic databases such as Lexis/Nexis, and internet 
archives in order to reconstruct each founder's job history prior to launching 
the new venture. For each of the 527 founders, we attempted to collect infor-
mation on all jobs held prior to the start of the new venture including the 
position held and the name of the employer. We contacted the human resources 
department for 20% of the firms and confirmed the founders prior place of 
employment. The career history data collection process generated a list of 1252 
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positions in 438 distinct prior employers. In our data, the number of prior jobs 
held by a given founder ranges from 0 to 9. Of the 527 founders we identified 
at least one prior employer for 420.5 Our key independent variable, employer 
prominence, requires that we have data on at least one prior employer for at 
least one member of the founding team. We were unable to collect any career 
history or educational background information for any of the founders at 9 of 
the 173 SPEC companies; thus our sample is reduced to 164 firms. 
Measuring the Prominence of Past Employers 
The central predictor of interest is the prominence of each founder's past employ-
ers. Our measure of prominence should capture the extent to which an existing 
firm is visible to those engaged in entrepreneurial activity (cf. Knoke & Burt, 
1983). Given the diversity of industries represented by our firms, it is difficult to 
think of a single dimension along which all of the firms can be unambiguously 
ranked. Asset- or revenue-based size measures may have some applicability to 
for-profit organizations, but are difficult to apply to universities, for example. 
Measures of technological prominence based on patents (Stuart et al., 1999) may 
also be a plausible basis for ranking firms. Again, however, difficulties arise with 
respect to cross-industry comparisons and with respect to the best way to 
characterize the prominence of firms operating in multiple industries. More 
importantly, it is unclear what criteria third parties in an entrepreneurial context 
use to assign prominence to existing firms, and whether these criteria are con-
sistent across industries. Ideally, we would want an independent reputation 
survey of all existing firms completed for each of the years from 1982 to 1992 
when sample ventures were founded. Unfortunately, we know of no such survey. 
For these reasons, we choose to arrive at the prominence of past employers 
inductively, based on the observed pattern of entrepreneurial activity in our 
sample. We measure a firm's prominence by the extent to which it has been a 
source of entrepreneurial ventures. Firms that generate a lot of new ventures 
should be more visible to other actors in the entrepreneurial community. In 
order to construct this measure, we start with a binary matrix of ties between 
the 164 new ventures in the SPEC sample that have some prior career data for 
the founders and the 438 past employers of all of the founders. A "tie" is formed 
if any member of the founding team had worked for the past employer. Thus 
entries in the cells i,j of this matrix are 0 if there is no founding member at 
start-up i who worked for the past employer j , and 1 if there is at least one 
founder who worked for the past employer j . Summing across the rows gener-
ates a count, for each start-up, of the number of prior employers represented 
on the founding team. 
i 
244 M. D. BURTON, J. B. S0RENSEN AND C. M. BECKMAN 
a. = ^2,x.. 
1
 j lJ 
Summing down the columns of this matrix generates a count, for each past 
employer, of the number of start-ups in the SPEC sample that have emanated 
from that employer. 
b.= £ J C . . - 1 
We subtract 1 from b. to exclude the focal start-up; if a past employer has only 
generated one start-up (each has generated at least one), it will have a promi-
nence score of zero. For each venture in the SPEC sample, we then generate 
a measure of the prominence of all of the past employers by summing the b. 
across each of the past employers represented on the founding team.6 
Using the observed entrepreneurial activity in our sample to measure the 
prominence of past employers may strike some as tautological, given that we are 
seeking to explain entrepreneurial activity. There are two reasons why we 
believe this is not so. First, we do not use this measure to predict the rate 
of entrepreneurial activity, but rather as a predictor of the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial activity. We do not see a necessary connection between our 
measure of prominence and whether entrepreneurs pursue innovation strategies, 
much less whether they are able to secure external financing at start-up. Second, 
we conceive of the SPEC sample of start-ups as generating a sample of past 
employers of start-up founders, where the past employers are represented 
proportional to the entrepreneurial activity that they generate. Our strategy thus 
parallels the National Organizations Survey, which generated a sample of 
organizations by asking randomly selected individuals to name their employers 
(Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden & Spaeth, 1996; see also McPherson, 1982). This 
sampling procedure - termed probability proportional to size sampling - is 
statistically optimal for populations where the elements vary widely in 
size (Sudman, 1976). We believe that replications of this procedure for new 
high-technology ventures in Silicon Valley would generate similar lists of past 
employers. 
The career history data collection process generated a list of 1252 positions 
in 438 distinct prior employers. If people were described as being in self-
employment (such as doctors or independent consultants), or for some other 
reason the firm was not identified, the "prior firm" was coded as missing. 
Missing prior firms account for 87 of the 1252 positions (6.9%). The remaining 
positions are in firms that range from familiar high-technology employers 
in Silicon Valley - such as Hewlett-Packard, Intel and Apple - through 
academic institutions - such as Stanford and Harvard - to the military and less 
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Firm 
IBM 
Hewlett-Packard 
Stanford University 
Apple 
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of concentration in entrepreneurial activity (see Table 1). 
For example, 6 prior employers dominate the list (IBM, Hewlett-Packard, 
Stanford University, Apple Computer, Intel, and National Semiconductor) and 
69 SPEC firms (46% of the sample) have at least one founder who worked at 
one of these six firms. It is also worth noting that, while this list captures many 
large Silicon Valley employers, it is not collinear with size. One of the largest 
employers, Lockheed, with over 21,000 employees in 1990, does not appear on 
the list of prominent firms. Furthermore, for firms such as Apple Computer 
(5,700 employees) and Sun Microsystems (7,700 employees) the prominence 
Table 1. Top 24 Entrepreneurially Prominent Firms in SPEC Sample. 
Firm # of SPEC Firms 
IBM 
Hewlett-Packard 
Stanford University 
Apple 
Intel 
National Semiconductor 
ROLM Corporation 
AT&T 
Sun Microsystems 
UC Berkeley 
Silicon Graphics 
Ungermann Bass 
AMD 
Digital Equipment Corporation 
MIPS Computer Systems 
NASA AMES 
NTH 
Xerox Corporation 
Bridge Communications, Inc. 
Chips and Technologies 
Control Data Corporation 
Texas Instruments Incorporated 
U.S Navy and Naval Reserve 
Harvard University 
21 
16 
15 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
6 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Note: SPEC firms can have multiple parents. For example, a SPEC firm may have one founder who 
worked at IBM, HP, and GE and a second founder who worked at HP and Honeywell. The career 
backgrounds are aggregated at the firm level; thus this SPEC firm has prior ties to four firms (IBM, 
HP, GE, and Honeywell) and would be listed in this table as coming from both IBM and HP. 
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measure appears unrelated to size. Apple's prominence score is double that of 
Sun's (12 compared to 6).7 
Control Variables 
In addition to the prominence of past employers, we control for a number of other 
characteristics of the SPEC companies and their founders (since we are studying 
the firms at their inception, there are few organizational characteristics to 
measure). In the external financing models, we control for how far along each 
company is in the entrepreneurial process by including an indicator as to whether 
or not they had a completed product ready for shipment within six months of 
founding. Having a working product, or even a product prototype, is one way 
that a firm can reduce the perceived uncertainty for external stakeholders. We 
believe that this approach to reducing uncertainty will be particularly effective 
for firms pursuing an innovation strategy; thus, we include an interaction term. 
We also control for industry for several reasons. We want to capture differences 
in the need for capital (medical devices companies on average should require 
more initial capital than software companies) and the attractiveness of an 
industry in the capital market. We also need to account for different baseline 
levels of innovativeness across industries. Finally, industries are not equally 
represented in the sample. In the analyses presented in this paper we include 
dummy variables for three broad industries: medical-related (including medical 
devices and biotechnology), networking and telecommunications, and semi-
conductors. The omitted category consists primarily of computer hardware 
and software companies, electronic component manufacturing companies, and 
contract research and development firms. 
Past research suggests that career experiences shape the propensity and ability 
of individuals to launch entrepreneurial ventures. We control for a number of 
such experience-related characteristics in our models. First, we control for the 
number of founders with prior entrepreneurial experiences. Second, we include 
measures of the number of founders with prior senior management experience. 
Some evidence indicates that venture capitalists take into account the manage-
ment experience of entrepreneurs (MacMillam et al , 1985). We also control 
for the number of founders with experience in sales/marketing or finance in 
order to control for the possibility that the perceived quality of a team may be 
related to the presence of functional diversity. 
Finally, we control for the general human capital of the founders by including 
education level in our analyses.8 Specifically, we measure the proportion of 
the founding team that has advanced degrees (i.e. more than a B.A.) We also 
consider the possibility that third parties might look to tangible measures of 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable 
Innovation Strategist 
External Financing within 3 mos. 
Product within 6 mos. 
Medical-related Industry 
Networking & Telecom. Industry 
Semiconductor Industry 
Prior Founding Experience 
Senior Management Experience 
Finance or Sales Experience 
Log Number of Patents 
Advanced Degrees 
Number of Past Employers 
Ties to Prominent Firms 
Mean 
0.491 
0.370 
0.185 
0.143 
0.202 
0.107 
0.560 
0.935 
1.185 
0.698 
0.784 
3.440 
9.595 
SD 
0.501 
0.484 
0.389 
0.351 
0.403 
0.310 
0.860 
1.079 
1.434 
0.967 
0.355 
2.107 
10.860 
Min 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
9 
3.85 
1 
11 
52 
N 
159 
138 
168 
168 
168 
168 
168 
168 
168 
166 
151 
168 
168 
accomplishment as an indicator of the quality of the founding team; thus, we 
collected information on all of the patents granted to each of the founders in our 
sample prior to the launch of the new venture.9 We interpret this as a measure 
of the technological or innovative competence of the founding team members.10 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables in the models. Bivariate 
correlations are presented in Appendix A. 
As is apparent from Table 2, almost half of the ventures in our sample pursue 
an innovation strategy. Slightly over a third of the SPEC companies have 
external financing at the time of founding, while approximately one-sixth 
have a product within the first six months. On average, 3.4 different employers 
are represented on each founding team, which is slightly more than the mean 
founding team size (2.95).11 The vast majority of prior employers (338 of 438) 
have a prominence score of 0. The maximum prominence score for a prior 
employer is 21. Aggregating across all prior employers for a team yields a 
prominence score range from 0 to 52 with the average SPEC firm earning 9.6 
points. 
RESULTS 
We argue that firms pursuing innovative strategies face higher levels of uncer-
tainty. Evidence of the higher level of uncertainty surrounding innovation 
strategists can be found in Table 3, which cross-classifies the initial strategy of 
the ventures in our sample by whether or not the firm had external financing 
at founding. 
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Table 3. Relationship between Strategy and External Financing. 
External Financing at Founding 
Strategy: No Yes 
Incremental 
Innovation 
31 
52% 
51 
72% 
29 
48% 
20 
28% 
60 
71 
Total 82 49 131 
X2 = 5.65 (1 d.f.), p < 0.02. 
While almost half of the incrementalist firms had external funding at the 
outset, only 28% of those firms pursuing an innovation obtained such funds. 
This difference is statistically significant. By construction, incrementalist firms 
are operating in known market niches where there are already established 
entities. There is both an identifiable market opportunity and a means to assess 
- and benchmark - the quality of the product or service being offered by the 
new venture. Neither is possible for innovative firms. Thus, we interpret this 
table to support our claims that third parties, such as venture capitalists, are 
less willing to provide initial funding to new ventures that pursue high-risk and 
uncertain innovation strategies. 
In Table 4, we present logistic regression estimates of the determinants of a 
new venture's strategy at the time of founding. We focus our discussion on the 
fourth column of results. The parameter estimates suggest that the past career 
experiences of founders have an impact on their choice of strategy. Teams with 
a lot of experience in sales or finance are, as might be expected, less likely to 
pursue innovation strategies. Graduate education also has a positive impact on 
the decision to pursue an innovation strategy. 
As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the prominence of past employers has a 
positive impact on the propensity to pursue risky strategies. A one-standard 
deviation increase in the average prominence of the founding team's past 
employers increase the odds of pursuing an innovation strategy by a factor of 
1.65. This result is consistent with our claim that entrepreneurs benefit from 
being associated with prominent employers. Our measure of the prominence 
of past employers captures the extent to which firms are at the center of 
entrepreneurial activity. This centrality in entrepreneurial networks can have 
both informational and reputational benefits which make it more likely that 
employees of prominent firms will pursue innovation strategies. 
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Experience 
Number of Past Employers 
Employer Prominence 
Constant 
Log-Likelihood 
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* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Founding 
Innovation Strategy (N = 159). 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Medical-related Industry 
Networking and 
Telecom. Industry 
Semiconductor Industry 
Log Number of Patents 
Graduate Degrees 
Prior Founding Experience 
Senior Management 
Experience 
Sales or Finance 
Experience 
Number of Past Employers 
Employer Prominence 
Constant 
1.745** 
(0.591) 
-0.420 
(0.419) 
0.187 
(0.545) 
1.255 
(0.641) 
-0.522 
(0.448) 
-0.215 
(0.632) 
0.418 
(0.217) 
1.429* 
(0.553) 
1.132 
(0.670) 
-0.621 
(0.480) 
-0.343 
(0.682) 
0.453 
(0.234) 
1.525** 
(0.569) 
0.185 
(0.234) 
0.026 
(0.201) 
-0.444** 
(0.165) 
1.399 
(0.709) 
-0.881 
(0.523) 
-0.328 
(0.746) 
0.372 
(0.243) 
1.384* 
(0.619) 
0.183 
(0.248) 
-0.135 
(0.226) 
-0.556** 
(0.175) 
0.164 
(0.136) 
0.046* 
(0.023) 
-0.187 
(0.217) 
-1.349 
(0.500) 
-0.972 
(0.526) 
-1.572 
(0.606) 
Log-Likelihood 
Pseudo R-squared 
159 
-103.03 
0.065 
144 
-86.586 
0.131 
144 
-81.537 
0.182 
144 
-75.453 
0.243 
! p<0.05 , **p<0.01 (two-sided tests). 
It is difficult to differentiate the information and reputation accounts as expla-
nations of the prominence effect. The information story suggests that employees 
of prominent firms take advantage of ideas and innovations that they are exposed 
to in the course of their work. Their employer may not be aware of these ideas, 
or may not be interested in pursuing them. In order to explore the role that 
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such exposure may play, we turned to the explanations given by founders in 
response to the question, "What was the catalyst or impetus for founding the 
company?" Out of these open-ended responses, we coded whether the founder 
indicated that the idea that formed the basis of the new venture had come from 
work being done at a prior employer. Of the firms for which we have such 
interviews (N= 131), 23% mentioned that projects they had undertaken in the 
context of a prior employment setting as the catalyst for starting the venture. 
In separate models, we included a dummy variable indicating whether such a 
project with a prior employer was the impetus for the new venture. This 
variable had no effect on the probability of pursuing an innovative strategy, 
and had a negligible effect on the relationship between the prominence of past 
employers and venture strategy. 
We also experimented with a different measure of employer prominence, in 
part because of our lingering concern over whether our effects are driven by 
differences in the size of prior employers. Size may be relevant since it has 
been shown to affect organizational innovation processes (Cohen & Levin, 
1989). We do not have direct measures of employer size. Instead, we created 
a dummy variable indicating whether the prior employer was listed in the Silicon 
Valley 100, an annual listing of the largest firms in Silicon Valley produced 
by the San Jose Mercury News. In separate analyses (available from the authors), 
we experimented with various ways of including information on the number of 
prior employers listed in the Silicon Valley 100. None of these affected the 
propensity of firms to pursue an innovation strategy, and the effects of entre-
preneurial prominence were robust throughout the different specifications. 
In Table 5 we turn our attention to the determinants of external financing at 
founding. These estimates are from logistic regression models of whether or 
not a venture had external financing within three months of founding. 
As the cross-classification in Table 3 suggested, firms pursuing an innova-
tion strategy are less likely to secure external financing at start-up. In the second 
model, we introduce an interaction effect between the firm's strategy and 
whether or not they had a product at founding. We see that these two 
variables have a complex effect on the likelihood of external financing at 
founding. The main effect of the product variable indicates that firms pursuing 
an incrementalist strategy are less likely to secure external financing at founding. 
This may seem counterintuitive. However, it is important to note that our 
dependent variable primarily captures infusions of venture capital, which comes 
at a higher cost than traditional sources of capital (such as bank loans). Since 
incrementalists are operating in established markets, those with a product in 
hand have the least need for this more expensive type of financing. In fact, 
they may be able to generate sufficient revenue from sales to mitigate the need 
Table 5. Logistic Regressioi 
Variable 
Medical-related 
Industry 
Networking and 
Telecom. Industry 
Semiconductor 
Industry 
Innovation 
Strategist 
Product 
Product * Innovation 
Strategy 
Graduate Degrees 
Log Number of 
Patents 
Prior Founding 
Experience 
Senior Management 
Experience 
Sales or Finance 
Experience 
Number of Past 
Employers 
Employer Prominence 
Innovation Strategy 
* Prominence 
Constant 
N 
Log-Likelihood 
Pseudo R-squared 
Financin: 
(l) 
-0.568 
(0.586) 
0.581 
(0.461) 
-0.268 
(0.663) 
-0.469 
(0.527) 
-0.705 
(0.399) 
-0.145 
(0.357) 
129 
-80.408 
0.056 
:
 p < 0.05, ** p< 0.01 (two-sided tests) 
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Estimates of the Determinants of External 
Financing at Start-up (N =128). 
t f 
Variable 
Medical-related 
Industry 
Networking and 
Telecom. Industry 
Semiconductor 
Industry 
Innovation 
Strategist 
Product 
Product * Innovation 
Strategy 
Graduate Degrees 
Log Number of 
Patents 
Prior Founding 
Experience 
Senior Management 
Experience 
Sales or Finance 
Experience 
Number of Past 
Employers 
Employer Prominence 
Innovation Strategy 
* Prominence 
Constant 
N 
Log-Likelihood 
Pseudo R-squared 
(1) 
-0.568 
(0.586) 
0.581 
(0.461) 
-0.268 
(0.663) 
-0.469 
(0.527) 
-0.705 
(0.399) 
-0.145 
(0.357) 
129 
-80.408 
0.056 
(2) 
-0.572 
(0.591) 
0.404 
(0.476) 
-0.235 
(0.674) 
-1.097 
(0.670) 
-0.993* 
(0.436) 
1.891 
(1.129) 
0.068 
(0.375) 
129 
-79.022 
0.072 
(3) 
-0.197 
(0.628) 
0.525 
(0.498) 
0.289 
(0.730) 
-1.488* 
(0.746) 
-1.018* 
(0.479) 
2.252 
(1.182) 
0.240 
(0.629) 
-0.403 
(0.242) 
-0.282 
(0.454) 
121 
-71.417 
0.1 
(4) 
-0.309 
(0.654) 
0.373 
(0.515) 
0.125 
(0.755) 
-1.568* 
(0.767) 
-1.079* 
(0.517) 
2.695* 
(1.231) 
0.262 
(0.636) 
-0.363 
(0.245) 
-0.058 
(0.285) 
0.350 
(0.214) 
-0.072 
(0.157) 
-0.116 
(0.474) 
121 
-69.964 
0.118 
(5) 
-0.236 
(0.701) 
0.587 
(0.538) 
-0.062 
(0.784) 
-1.697* 
(0.789) 
-0.940 
(0.533) 
3.025* 
(1.284) 
0.261 
(0.655) 
-0.338 
(0.249) 
-0.023 
(0.289) 
0.513* 
(0.235) 
-0.009 
(0.161) 
-0.235 
(0.144) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
-0.155 
(0.521) 
121 
-68.350 
0.138 
(6) 
-0.066 
(0.720) 
0.300 
(0.568) 
-0.209 
(0.811) 
-2.009* 
(0.816) 
-2.286** 
(0.780) 
3.201* 
(1.306) 
0.455 
(0.695) 
-0.318 
(0.256) 
-0.242 
(0.314) 
0.545* 
(0.247) 
0.025 
(0.176) 
-0.226 
(0.149) 
-0.072 
(0.042) 
0.115* 
(0.048) 
0.432 
(0.596) 
121 
-64.817 
0.183 
;p<0.05, **/><0.01 (two-sided tests). 
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for any external financing. Turning to innovation strategists, the interaction 
effects suggests that for these firms, having a product makes it more likely that 
the firm will receive external financing at founding. Unlike incrementalist 
ventures, however, innovative start-ups are more in need of venture capital due 
to the uncertainty surrounding the market for their products. 
In the next two models, we include measures of the experiences and achieve-
ments of the founding team. First, we see that prior founding experience has 
no effect on the odds that a new venture will receive external financing at 
founding. This may be due to the fact that our measure captures only whether 
or not a founder had been involved with a prior start-up, but nothing about the 
outcome. If the prior founding experiences have had negative outcomes, third 
parties may be hesitant to invest in another venture. Alternatively, if the prior 
founding experience had been successful, and the entrepreneur has "cashed out," 
his or her own personal wealth may obviate the need for external financing in 
the early stages of the firm. It is also worth noting that prior founding experi-
ence is significantly correlated with senior management experience - which has 
a positive effect on the odds of attracting external stakeholders. Founding teams 
whose members include at least one with prior senior management experience 
are more likely to secure external financing at founding. This is consistent with 
studies showing that venture capitahsts value the management experiences of 
entrepreneurs when evaluating proposals (MacMillan et al., 1985). Neither the 
innovative ability of the founders, as measured by the number of patents held, 
nor graduate credentials have a significant effect.12 
We see in the fifth model in Table 5 that the prominence of past employers 
initially has no significant effect on the odds of securing external financing at 
start-up, suggesting no support for Hyothesis 2. However, this model does not 
take into account the different levels of uncertainty associated with innovation 
strategies and incrementalists. We expect entrepreneurial prominence to be 
especially beneficial when the perceived uncertainty of the venture is high, such 
as when a firm pursues an innovative strategy. In the final model (model 6) in 
Table 5, the effect of employer prominence differs for the two types of firms. 
Among firms pursuing an innovation strategy, employer prominence has the 
expected positive and statistically significant effect on the odds of securing 
external financing at start-up. For innovative ventures, where the quality of the 
venture team is arguably of greatest importance, employer prominence has a 
significant effect on the ability of the founders to secure resources from external 
providers.13 (Separate analyses (not shown) using the Silicon Valley 100 
measures discussed above had no influence on the pattern of results.) This 
supports our claim that the reputational benefits of employer prominence reduces 
the perceived uncertainty of new ventures and facilitates entrepreneurial activity. 
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The analyses presented in this paper provide evidence supporting the claim 
that career histories shape the entrepreneurial process. First, functional and 
educational backgrounds influence initial strategic choices, and management 
experience is important to external stakeholders. Entrepreneurs with advanced 
degrees establish firms with innovation strategies, but entrepreneurs with sales or 
finance experience are less likely to pursue an innovation strategy. Entrepreneurs 
with senior management experience have more legitimacy with external con-
stituents and are more likely to obtain external financing. These findings are con-
sistent with work on human capital and the importance of career histories on the 
formation of new ventures. Our work moves beyond these findings, however, to 
address the importance of social capital for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs setting 
out from prominent employers have both information and reputation advantages 
over those who emanate from less prominent firms. It is important to note not only 
what experiences and background entrepreneurs have but also where these 
experiences come from. The information and reputation advantages that accrue 
from social capital allow entrepreneurs from prominent firms to pursue more risky 
ventures, such as founding a firm dedicated to establishing a new product or 
market. The reputational capital derived from being affiliated with a prominent 
employer also allows entrepreneurs to reduce the perceived uncertainty of their 
venture, thereby facilitating the acquisition of resources from third parties. Risky 
ventures (those pursuing an innovation strategy) that emerge from prominent 
employers are more likely to obtain external financing. 
While we believe our analyses are persuasive, they are limited in certain 
respects. First, our data do not allow us to distinguish between a desire to 
launch a new venture pursuing an innovation strategy, and the ability to do so. 
This makes it difficult to specify clearly the mechanism by which employer 
prominence influences the choice of initial strategy. Specifically, we cannot 
confidently determine whether individuals from prominent employers are more 
likely to launch innovative ventures because they are privy to superior infor-
mation, or because they benefit from the prominence of their employers in 
convincing third parties to support the venture. Distinguishing between these 
accounts would require a more detailed study of proposed entrepreneurial 
ventures and the process by which they move from initial concepts to nascent 
firms. Despite this limitation, what we do know is important: entrepreneurs 
from prominent employers launch more innovative ventures, and those ventures 
are more likely to obtain external financing. 
Second, while our interpretation of these results emphasizes the benefits of 
prominent structural locations, we are sensitive to alternative explanations that 
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point to the possible effects of unobserved heterogeneity among founders. It is 
possible that the observed effects of entrepreneurial prominence are due to 
unobserved characteristics of established firms and the employees they attract. 
For example, entrepreneurially prominent firms may attract employees whose 
personal characteristics make them particularly likely both to pursue innovative 
ventures and to win the confidence of external investors. As with any such claim, 
we cannot rule out with certainty that the findings can be attributed to unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, we feel confident that we have measured and controlled 
for several of the most important individual-level characteristics that can most 
plausibly be thought to affect the outcomes we examine. Our models include mea-
sures of the patenting activities of the founders, their educational backgrounds, 
their prior work experiences and their past entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, we 
have no a priori reasons to expect that the firms identified as entrepreneurially 
prominent in this sample should differ systematically in their recruitment 
behavior. At the same time, we believe that an important and promising line of 
future research would be to explain why firms differ in the rate at which they 
generate new ventures through employee departures. The limited amount of work 
that has been done in this area suggests that such variations can be traced to 
differences in internal promotion chances, reward levels, technological emphases 
and managerial practices (Freeman, 1986; Brittain & Freeman, 1986). A full 
understanding of how established firms shape entrepreneurial behavior must 
attend to both the cause and the consequences of entrepreneurial prominence. 
Finally, the diversity of firms in the SPEC data set, although useful for 
understanding a broad set of organizations, has certain shortcomings. Ideally, 
in addition to our employer prominence measure, we would have an exogenous 
measure of the prominence of past employers. The broad set of industries 
represented in the sample make such a measure difficult to generate. For studies 
of new ventures within a single industry, measures of technological or 
innovative prominence may be appropriate. Stuart et al. (1999), for example, 
measure the prominence of alliance partners using counts of citations to a firm's 
patent portfolio. The development of exogenous measures of prominence 
requires confidence about the criteria by which members of the entrepreneurial 
community rank existing firms. To our knowledge, this topic is unexplored in 
the existing literature. Furthermore, an exogenous measurement of prominence 
has its own problems. No clear dimension exists on which we could compare 
the prominence of a biotechnology firm with the prominence of a hardware 
firm. As such, single industry studies may be more appropriate places to develop 
exogenous measures of prominence. 
We began this paper by arguing that the landscape of existing firms shapes 
the entrepreneurial process. We believe our results demonstrate that patterns 
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of entrepreneurial activity are shaped by the social structure of existing 
organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965; Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986). Our work is, 
therefore, an important complement to studies showing how the general scarcity 
of resources affects the formation of new firms (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). In 
particular, these findings stress the importance of hierarchical differentiation 
in the social structure of organizational populations (Podolny, 1993; Podolny 
et al., 1996; Stuart et al., 1999). We know from this existing work that 
prominence dictates future patterns of affiliation, firm survival, and performance. 
We find additional benefits accruing from prominence: firms emanating from 
prominent firms are more innovative. 
For network theorists, our work further confirms the importance of network 
position. Entrepreneurs with prominent past employers occupy a privileged place 
in the social structure, and their position garners important advantages with 
respect to access to resources and information. What we add to the network 
literature is an examination of how the network of existing organizations impacts 
the new venture, and by extension the new venture network. The new ventures 
that spawn from prominent employers may occupy a more prominent position 
in their own network. The access to external funding immediately connects 
these innovative new ventures into an exclusive network of organizations. The 
innovative strategies of these firms may lead them to higher visibility in their 
own industries. And the fact that they emerge from prominent others may 
imprint them with positional advantage from the very beginning (Stinchcombe, 
1965). Prominence may not only be fairly stable over time, it may transfer from 
one organization to the other through entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the impact 
of the new venture's lineage may have implications far beyond founding. These 
possibilities offer intriguing directions for future research. 
We noted earlier that organizational researchers have grown increasingly 
interested in the role managerial careers play in shaping organizational behavior 
and industry dynamics. Most research in this tradition focuses on how career 
histories shape individual experiences and abilities (Boeker, 1997; S0rensen, 
1999). Our research emphasizes that careers have important reputational 
consequences as well. In this respect, the identity of a person's employers 
(and perhaps other institutional affiliations) assumes primary significance. 
Organizational reputations transfer to individual reputations. Inferences about 
the talents and abilities of individuals are constructed from their histories of 
affiliation with employers. This parallels studies of scientific careers, which 
have documented that the prestige of the university a person attended has a 
positive effect on the prestige of the first job (Hurlbert & Rosenfeld, 1992). 
Our results suggest, however, that the effects of institutional or organizational 
prestige extend beyond the signals associated with educational credentials and 
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encompass the firms and other organizations that people move through in the 
course of their careers. Moreover, the effects of institutional prestige extend 
beyond their impact on individual life courses. The role that hierarchical differ-
entiation among organizations plays in both individual career dynamics and 
organizational populations, and the interconnections between the two levels of 
analysis, is an important arena for future research. 
Future research should examine other benefits of entrepreneurial prominence. 
We find a link between prominence and innovative strategies and external 
funding, but prominent past employers may continue to impact internal organi-
zational decisions through means like the recruitment of personnel from 
prominent firms. Ventures spawned from prominent employers may be more 
likely to go public successfully, or they may be more likely to be acquired by a 
larger, more established firm attempting to increase their own prominence. These 
various research possibilities point out how disentangling where imprinting ends 
and path dependence begins offers a challenge to future research. 
Our research contributes to a greater understanding of what differentiates new 
ventures. In order to understand the emergence of innovative new ventures, we 
need to know where they come from in the network of existing organizations. 
Past employer prominence offers firms a significant advantage in the struggle 
for survival and success. We tie new ventures into the existing social structure 
and point out that a new venture is more than a compilation of skills and expe-
riences, but it emerges from other organizations with positions in the social 
structure. Without incorporating the existing social structure into our under-
standing of new ventures, we cannot hope to understand why one venture 
survives and another fails, much less why the occasional venture succeeds 
beyond all expectations. Despite the rapid rate of new venture formation, the 
ever changing technology, and the considerable hurdles new ventures face, the 
underlying stability of the social structure offers a means to understand and 
keep up with the changing organizational landscape. 
NOTES 
1. Note that we do not seek to explain why some firms generate more entrepreneurial 
offspring than others; rather, we take this distribution as given. See Freeman (1986) and 
Brittain and Freeman (1986) for a discussion of these issues. 
2. For details on the data collection and coding methods, see Burton (1995); Baron, 
Burton and Hannan (1996); Hannan, Burton and Baron (1996). These publications 
describe the original sample of 100 firms for which data was gathered in the summer 
of 1994. The sampling and data collection strategies were replicated in the summer of 
1995 to supplement the sample with an additional 72 firms (See Baron, Hannan & Burton 
1999, 2000 for more information). 
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3. The financing history data collection effort was led by Professors Thomas Hellmann 
and Manju Puri of the Stanford Graduate School of Business (Hellmann & Puri, 1999). 
Sixty-six firms (38%) responded to a finance history survey that was addressed to the 
senior executive responsible for finance. Data for a large number of the sample firms 
was available from commercially available databases that track the venture capital 
industry. 107 (62%) of the SPEC sample firms had records in the Venture One data-
base (see Gompers & Lerner (2000) for a discussion of this database); 95 (55%) had 
records in the Venture Economics database (see Lerner, 1995, for a discussion of this 
database). Additional information was gleaned from the founder interview transcripts as 
well as archival research in the business press. 
4. We tested alternative intervals. The results when we more strictly define the date 
of financing are weaker, since there are fewer positive outcomes, but in the same 
direction. We obtain statistically significant findings that are substantially equivalent to 
those reported when we expand the financing interval to be within the first six months 
of founding. We chose to report the analyses from the slightly more conservative 
three-month interval. 
5. We confirmed that there were at least 38 additional founders who began working 
at the SPEC firm directly from school and thus their number of prior employment ties 
was truly 0. For the remaining 69 it is difficult to ascertain whether missing data arises 
because the founder had no prior jobs, or whether the experience was simply not 
reported in our sources. We suspect that there is some bias toward large, established 
firms being mentioned in press accounts about the individuals in our sample; employers 
that are less important in the eyes of the media may not be mentioned in newspaper 
stories and press releases. We attempt to account for this problem in our analyses by 
replicating the models using different numbers of prior jobs (see note 11). At a 
minimum, it is important to note that since we were unable to administer job history 
interviews to the founders, these data are imperfect records of the career histories of 
the SPEC entrepreneurs. 
6. This measure of prominence will increase on average with the number of prior 
employers recorded for a founding team. In order to account for this, we control for 
the number of past employers in the models. 
7. Numbers of employees by firm is based on data from September 1990 and was 
reported in a San Jose Mercury News article, "Largest Employers" printed Monday, 
January 14, 1991 on page 2C. 
8. The models that we report in this paper include only the education control 
variables. The findings are equivalent when we include age as a proxy for experience; 
however our sample size is dramatically reduced due to the difficulty in locating 
reliable birthdates for the founders. 
9. Patent data for each individual was collected through the U.S. Patent Office's 
web site: http://www.uspto.gov 
10. We also collected information on the number of citations to each founder's 
portfolio of patents; however, this had no effect in our models. 
11. It is possible that our data collection strategy misses firms that are prominent in 
an entrepreneurial context but that do not garner media attention. For these reasons, 
we conducted the analyses using only the immediately prior job for each founder, using 
three prior jobs per founder, and using all available data. The results conform to our 
hypothesized expectations; however, the prominence distribution is greatly constrained 
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in the first case and dramatically skewed in the latter. We report the intermediate choice, 
allowing up to three prior jobs for each founder, in this paper. 
12. We tested for an interaction effect with the strategy of the firm; it was not significant. 
13. Arguably, the firms with the greatest uncertainty surrounding their quality are 
innovation strategists without a product at the time of founding. This suggests a three-
way interaction between strategy, product at founding and employer prominence. We 
tested for this interaction in a separate model, not shown here. Employer prominence 
has no significant effect for innovators with a product, but does have a significant effect 
for innovators without a product. This is consistent with our argument. 
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